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Securities Fraud, Recidivism, and
Deterrence
Jayne W. Barnard*
Legal scholars have expended considerable energy on the study of
high-level securities fraud violators-Ken Lay, Bernie Ebbers, Dennis
Kozlowski, etc.
There has been little attention, however, to the
perpetrators of "retail" securities fraud-the con artists who sell bogus
stock over the Internet, orchestrate elaborate pump-and-dump schemes,
and create a never-ending array of purportedly "risk free" investment
opportunities. Collectively, and in a cruel mockery of capitalism, these
offenders extract hundreds of millions dollars from investors each year.
In this article, Professor Barnard examines this group of offenders,
focusing particularly on those who recidivate-often moving from state
to state and scheme to scheme, with little interruption from the law
enforcement community. She hypothesizes that offenders in this group,
much like sex offenders, may be "hard wired" to engage in fraudulent
behavior. Even if that is not the case, however, these offenders present a
much greater risk to the public than the current SEC enforcement regime
contemplates. She proposes a series of new enforcement strategies to
deal with this predatory population.

* James Goold Cutler Professor of Law, The College of William & Mary. Thanks
to attendees at the Law & Society Association 2006 annual meeting, especially Tamar
Frankel, Maggie Sachs, Lisa Nicholson, and Usha Rodrigues, for their thoughtful
comments on an early draft of this paper. Thanks also to John Tucker, Joan Heminway,
and Neal Shover for their suggestions on subsequent drafts. Thanks to two sources
within the SEC's Enforcement Division who provided useful background information.
William & Mary students Melissa Gainey, Amy Ginger, Chris Toepp, Brent Dougal, and
Kimberly Wilson, all contributed research and ideas to this project. This project
benefited from summer research support from The College of William & Mary.
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INTRODUCTION

This Article is about people who commit securities fraud-men and
women (though mostly men) who prey upon victims by selling them
securities through materially misleading sales techniques. The frauds
they commit are not the systemic, organizational frauds that command
the attention of the popular press. Rather, these offenders engage in
"retail" securities fraud-sales made to investors on a one-on-one basis
and schemes (like "pump-and-dump" schemes) designed to induce
individual trades. Retail securities fraud costs investors hundreds of
millions of dollars each year. 1
This Article focuses on the population of offenders who engage
repeatedly in retail securities fraud-securities fraud recidivists. Many
of these offenders move from state to state and scheme to scheme over
decades.
Sometimes they engage in face-to-face schemes but
increasingly they are conducting their frauds over the Internet. Securities
fraud recidivists often thwart the best efforts of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) to detect and deter them.
The securities fraud recidivists of particular interest here are those
who have engaged in three, four, or even more fraudulent schemes-they
are career con artists. Over the course of their careers, they have adapted
to new technologies, new sales techniques, and multi-continent financial
arrangements. They are smart, personable, crafty, and cruel.
I will make two points in this Article: (I) securities fraud recidivists
are not merely economic opportunists-some of them may have an
1. See, e.g., SEC v. Lane, SEC Litig. Rei. 20393,2007 SEC LEXIS 2879 (Dec. 11,
2007) (noting the granting of an asset freeze in a case involving a pyramid scheme that
raised over $132 million); SEC v. May, SEC Litig. Rei. 20366, 2007SEC LEXIS 2682
(Nov. 20, 2007) (announcing action against a defendant who raised $250 million through
the sale of worthless stock); SEC v. Global Online Direct, Inc., SEC Litig. Rei. 20359,
2007 SEC LEXIS 2585 (Nov. 6, 2007) (noting settlement of a case involving a Ponzi
scheme that raised $45 million); SEC v. Kelly, SEC Litig. Rei. 20267, 2007 SEC LEXIS
1105 (Sept. 5, 2007) (announcing action against 26 defendants in a $428 million
securities fraud scheme); SEC v. Roberts, SEC Litig. Rei. 20264, 2007 SEC LEXIS 1950
(Aug. 31, 2007) (announcing emergency action to halt a $50 million Ponzi scheme); SEC
v. Secure Investment Services, Inc., SEC Litig. Rei. 20255, 2007 SEC LEXIS 1897 (Aug.
24, 2007) (announcing action in a case involving a $25 million Ponzi scheme); SEC v.
AmeriFirst Funding, Inc., SEC Litig. Rei. 20236, 2007 SEC LEXIS 1781 (Aug. 9, 2007)
(noting entry of a preliminary injunction and asset freeze in a case involving $55 million
in fraudulent securities sales); SEC v. AOB Commerce, Inc., SEC Litig. Rei. 20196, 2007
SEC LEXIS 1549 (July 16, 2007) (noting the filing of an emergency action to halt a $45
million Ponzi scheme); United States v. Resteiner, SEC Litig. Rei. 20170, 2007 SEC
LEXIS 1415 (June 28, 2007) (describing sentencing of defendant in criminal case who
orchestrated a $30 million fraudulent investment scheme); SEC v. Conway, SEC Litig.
Rei. 20145, 2007 SEC LEXIS 1244 (June 6, 2007) (describing sentencing of defendant
who defrauded investors of$20 million).
HeinOnline -- 113 Penn St. L. Rev. 191 2008-2009

192

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 113:1

inherent psychopathology that compels them to defraud others and to
recidivate after being caught and (2) the current law-enforcement
mechanisms for dealing with these recidivists-a series of fines,
occupational bars, and "obey-the-law" injunctions-are inadequate to
curb the harms that securities fraud recidivists inflict.
This Article will unfold as follows: first, I will tell the stories of
three securities fraud recidivists and their interactions with the SEC. 2
Then, I will lay out some background information about con men
generally. 3 Con men appear in every culture and in many guises. They
also share many common characteristics: general intelligence; verbal
agility; narrative imagination and the ability to craft a fraud "script";
improvisational skills; a keen sensitivity to their victims' desires and
changing levels of trust; "nerve" and "coolness"; "larceny sense";
business acumen; charm; believability; and, perhaps above all, a keen
appreciation of human greed and the ability to encourage and exploit
their victims' worst impulses.
I will then tum to the problem of deterrence. The most common
response to retail securities fraud is a civil enforcement action brought by
the SEC. In most of these cases, the sanctions are quite modestdisgorgement of proceeds, a civil penalty, an injunction, and sometimes
an occupational bar. 4 Often, a defendant will receive two, three, or even
more sequential civil sanctions before the Department of Justice initiates
criminal prosecution. 5
Many times, defendants elude criminal
prosecution altogether.
I will then suggest that many individuals who engage in securities
fraud-and especially securities fraud recidivists-may be "hard-wired"
to engage in fraudulent schemes. Recent neuroscientific studies support
this position. 6

2. See infra Part II.
3. See infra Part III.
4. See infra Part IV.
5. The record holder for civil sanctions is likely to be Marshall Zolp, who has been
enjoined five times in SEC proceedings, each time for a different fraud. See, e.g., SEC v.
New Energy Corp., SEC Litig. Rei. 18712, 2004 SEC LEXIS 1019 (May 14, 2004)
(noting entry of a permanent injunction against Zolp under the alias Marcelino Colt in the
Central District of California); SEC v. Laser Arms. Corp., SEC Litig. Rei. 11346, 1987
SEC LEXIS 2676 (Feb. 3, 1987) (same in the Southern District of New York); SEC v.
Zolp and Emervac Corp., SEC Litig. Rei. 9831, 1982 SEC LEXIS 191 (Dec. 9, 1982)
(same in the Southern District of California); SEC v. Great Bison Toy Corp., SEC Litig.
Rei. 9688, 1982 SEC LEXIS 1515 (June 9, 1982) (same in the Northern District of
Illinois); SEC v. Sparks Industries, Inc., SEC Litig. Rei. 9584, 1982 SEC LEXIS 2258
(Feb. 16, 1982) (same in the Northern District of Georgia). Zolp is currently serving six
years in prison for his role in the latest of these frauds. See SEC v. New Energy Corp.,
SEC Litig. Rei. 19670, 2006 SEC LEXIS 952 (Apr. 26, 2006).
6. See infra Part III.E.
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I will suggest specifically that many securities fraud recidivists
suffer from Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD). 7 People with this
disorder are often highly manipulative and always remorseless. They are
unlikely to be deterred by monetary penalties or injunctions. They may
not even be deterred by incarceration. 8
I will end with a prescription for dealing with securities fraud
recidivists. 9 First, I propose a "one bite" rule at the SEC in which
securities fraud recidivists are not offered a second (or third) civil
sanction, but are quickly referred to the Department of Justice for
criminal prosecution. Second, I propose a Securities Fraud Recidivist
Task Force that will focus on the identification and punishment of
securities fraud recidivists. Third, I propose some form of monitoring
following the identification of first offenders whose conduct and history
suggest a likelihood of recidivism. Orwellian as it may seem, this kind
of monitoring is a legitimate function of the SEC. Fourth, I propose a
user-friendly registry, in which securities fraud recidivists can more
easily be identified by prospective investors. Fifth, I propose some
Congressional additions to the available list of securities fraud sanctions.
Finally, I propose an ongoing research agenda, by which emerging
knowledge about brain structure and neuroscience can be applied to the
universe of securities fraud recidivists. This type of knowledge is now
infusing many forms of legal inquiry. 10 With hundreds of millions of
dollars at stake, we need to know much more about securities fraud
recidivists.
II.

THREE ILLUSTRATIONS

To understand the typical life-pattern of a securities fraud recidivist,
let us begin with the story of Frank J. Custable, Jr. Early in his career,
Custable was accused of sales-tax fraud as a used car dealer. 11 He then,
perhaps surprisingly, secured a license to sell securities.
From July, 1989, through November, 1990, Custable engaged in
unauthorized trades in five separate customer accounts at his firm. He
7. See id.
8. See, e.g., Steven Syre, Convicted Three Times of Fraud, Promoter Faces New
Questions, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. I, 2007, at E I (tracing the career of Robert Dilanni,
who had been "sent to prison three different times over securities frauds involving
millions of dollars" and was found, upon completion of his most recent sentence,
engaged in new schemes).
9. See infra Part VI.
10. See, e.g., 0. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the "Complexity" of Capital
Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1265, 1290-91 (2007) (describing the recent use of
neuroscience in both civil and criminal cases).
II. Dave Schneidman, Car Dealers Indicted in Sales-Tax Fraud, CHI. TRIB., June
24, 1986, at Chicagoland 3.
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also made fraudulent misrepresentations to his customers and then
apparently bullied them into paying for the unwanted stock. The
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) censured Custable,
barred him from associating with NASD member firms, and fined him
$100,000. The SEC sustained the NASD's action. 12
Custable then turned to a new way of making money. From
January, 1993, through June, 1994, he "[sold] notes secured by mobile
homes and limited partnership interests in [these] notes, by cold-calling
the public[,] thereby raising at least $639,464 from the sale of 59 notes to
investors located in at least three states." 13 His sales pitch was full of
material misrepresentations.14
Illinois regulators filed a civil suit against him, seeking restitution. 15
The SEC also initiated an enforcement action against him. Custable
consented to a settlement enjoining him from violating the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws in the future (this is known as an
"obey-the-law" injunction). 16 He also agreed to disgorge $324,970. 17
The court later imposed a $60,000 civil penalty. 18 When Custable failed
to pay the civil penalty, the U.S. District Court found him liable for civil
contempt. 19
A few years later, Custable resurfaced with a new scheme involving
the sale of penny stocks. The scheme "involved at least seven different
penny stocks and generated at least $4.3 million in ill-gotten gains." 20

12. In re Custable, Exchange Act Release No. 32,801, 54 S.E.C. Docket 1808 (Aug.
25, 1993).
13. SEC v. Custable, SEC Litig. Rei. 14131, 1994 SEC LEXIS 1948 (June 22,
1994).
14. See id.
[He told] investors that the notes [were] secured by liens on real estate when, in
fact they [were] secured by personal property in the form of mobile homes; that
the notes [were] liquid, offered at a discount and seasoned when, in fact, they
[were] not; and that the loan-to-value ratio of the notes [was] no higher than
75% when, in fact, in most cases it [exceeded] 100% and [ranged] as high as
325%. The omissions include[d] [his] failure to tell investors that the mobile
homes [were] not sufficient collateral for such notes in that they [were], among
other things, old and in very poor condition and that [Custable had an]
extensive disciplinary history with securities regulators. [Custable continued]
to engage in such activities in Illinois despite the State's recent action barring
[him] from selling securities in Illinois.
!d.
15. The Ticker, CHI. SUN- TIMES, Jan. 12, 1994, at 49.
16. SEC v. Custable, SEC Litig. Rei. 14374, 1995 SEC LEXIS 18 (Jan. 4, 1995).
17. /d.
18. SEC v. Custable, SEC Litig. Rei. 14965, 1996 SEC LEXlS 2794 (June 27,
1996).
19. SEC v. Custable, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1776 (Feb. 10, 1999).
20. SEC v. Custable, SEC Litig. Ret. 18057,2003 SEC LEXIS 756 (Mar. 31, 2003).
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The SEC initiated a new enforcement action against Custable. 21 The
Commission sought a disgorgement order, a civil penalty, and a penny
stock bar against him. 22 Custable invoked the Fifth Amendment in
responding to the SEC's complaint. 23
While the SEC matter was pending, another of Custable's
businesses was the subject of a $4.7 million default judgment in Texas.24
Custable also pled guilty to obstructing justice by lying about his assets
in order to avoid paying the civil penalty entered against him in 1996.25
For this, he was sentenced to ten months in federal prison. 26
Custable was finally indicted in 2005 on charges relating to the
penny stock sales. 27 At this point, he had been engaged in securities
fraud schemes for 17 years.
Consider another story, similar in its outline but quite different in its
details. In 1988, Roc G. Hatfield was the chief operating officer of a
company called Centuri Mining Corp., which purported to operate a gold
mine in Colombia.28 The company sold unregistered securities in the
United States, and misrepresented the status of Centuri's gold mining
operations, the true value of the company's gold reserves, the safety of
the investment, and the intended use of the offering proceeds. 29
Centuri's sales materials included a fabricated independent geologist's
report.
The SEC brought a civil enforcement action against Centuri and its
managers. 30 After protesting that he was a victim of an overzealous
regulator and that the claims against him were a "pack of Iies," 31 Hatfield
settled the case, agreeing to disgorge his profits from the scheme.32 The
court also entered an obey-the-law injunction. 33

21. !d.
22. !d.
23. SEC Target Custable Pleads the Fifth, STOCK WATCH, Aug. 8, 2005 .
24. PYBS: Enters Factoring Agrmnt; Lawsuit Victory for $4. 7M, KNOBIAS.COM,
May4, 2004.
25. Trader admits lying in lawsuit, CHI. TRIB., June 8, 2004, at C2 .
26. SEC Target Custable Pleads the Fifth, supra note 23.
27 . Matt O'Connor, Ex-trader indicted in penny stock case, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 9, 2005,
at C2.
28 . SEC v. Centuri Mining Corp., SEC Litig. Rei. 12195, 1989 SEC LEXIS 1483
(Aug. 3, 1989).
29. !d.
30. SEC v. Centuri Mining Corp., SEC Litig. Rei. 11913, 1988 SEC LEXIS 2312
(Nov. 18, 1988).
31 . Wendy Weyen, SEC Lawsuit is "Lies," Company Official Says, St. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Nov. II, 1988, at 7C.
32. SEC v. Centuri Mining Corp., SEC Litig. Rei. 12195, 1989 SEC LEXIS 1483
(Aug. 3, 1989).
33. !d.
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A few years later, Hatfield-remarkably-had found a job as the
chief executive officer of a brokerage firm that sold securities in seven
states. Using a telephone "boiler room," Hatfield promoted the sale of
stock in a company called Marada Corporation. Hatfield claimed
Marada had contracts with foreign governments to operate an airline, and
to develop and operate hotels and casinos. Hatfield also claimed that
Marada was soon to be listed on the NASDAQ. None of these
representations were true. 34 The SEC initiated a new civil enforcement
proceeding and Hatfield ultimately settled the case and agreed to the
entry of a second obey-the-law injunction. 35 He was also barred from
association with any broker, dealer, or investment adviser, and barred
from engaging in the sale of any penny stock.36 Hatfield was separately
indicted by state authorities on charges of grand theft, 37 and ultimately
served two years in a California prison. 38
In September, 2001, Hatfield launched yet another scheme in which
he promoted unregistered "high-yield notes," promising a 24-percent
annual retum. 39 The notes, issued by a company called Global Diamond
Fund, Inc., were said to be secured by diamonds but were not. The SEC
brought a third civil enforcement action, and this time persuaded the
court to enter an asset freeze against Hatfield. 40 The SEC also sought a
contempt order against him for violating the obey-the-law injunction
entered against him in 1995. 41
As this third civil case was proceeding, Hatfield was held in
contempt for violating the asset freeze. 42 The SEC also sought a
contempt order when Hatfield failed to pay $25,000 to one of his Marada
victims. 43 After agreeing to a payment schedule, Hatfield reneged and

34. In re Roc G. Hatfield, Exchange Act Release No. 36,846, 61 S.E.C. Docket 711
(Feb. 14, 1995).
35. !d.
36. /d.
37. Rex Henderson, California Grand Jury Indicts Marada Founder, TAMPA TRIB.,
May 3, 1995, at 8.
38. Jane Meinhardt, Pre-Construction Firm Owner's Past Concerns Investors,
TAMPA BAY Bus. J., June 9, 2006.
39. SEC v. Marada Global Corp., SEC Litig. Rei. 17441, 2002 SEC LEXIS 752
(Mar. 27, 2002).
40. Business Today, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 28,2002, at IE.
41. SEC v. Marada Global Corp., SEC Litig. Rei. 17441, 2002 SEC LEXIS 752
(Mar. 27, 2002).
42 . SEC v. Marada Global Corp., SEC Litig. Rei. 17748, 2002 SEC LEXIS 2448
(Sept. 26, 2002).
43. SEC v. Marada Global Corp., SEC Litig. Rel.l8062, 2003 SEC LEXIS 766
(Apr. 2, 2003).
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was held in contempt again. 44 All in all, during the course of this case,
Hatfield was held in contempt three times. The final result, though, was
the entry, by consent, of another obey-the-law injunction. 45
Recently, Hatfield was found selling partnership interests in a real
estate project in Tampa. The company's prospectus did not mention
Hatfield's past securities violations or criminal history. 46 There was also
some evidence that his new business did not really exist. 47
Of course, these days, some of the most effective securities fraud
schemes are conducted over the Intemet. 48 The face-to-face frauds of
men like Frank Custable and Roc Hatfield may seem quaint compared to
the Internet-based frauds that can generate millions of dollars in just a
few days or weeks. 49
Consider the story of Lloyd Benton Sharp, a man whose fraud
In 1983, Sharp was selling
schemes have evolved over time.
unregistered promissory notes, partnerships, and other securities using
conventional solicitation methods. 50 He raised more than $5 million
from some 300 investors by means of material misstatements and
omissions. The SEC brought a civil enforcement action against Sharp,
and the court entered an obey-the-law injunction against him. 5 1
Then, in 1989, Sharp was charged by Arizona regulators with
violations of the state's Fraudulent Schemes and Artifices Act in
connection with boiler room sales of interests in a gold mine. 52 The
Federal Trade Commission also charged Sharp with fraudulent sales in
violation of the Federal Trade Act. 53 Sharp defaulted in that case, and, in
his absence, the court entered an obey-the-law injunction against him. 54
Sharp then began offering, over the Internet, unregistered limited
partnership interests in a venture claiming to grow and market paulownia
trees through an entity named Pension Plans of America, Inc. ("PPA"). 55
44. SEC v. Marada Global Corp., SEC Litig. Rei. 18918, 2004 SEC LEXIS 2300
(Oct. 5, 2004).
45 . SEC v. Marada Global Corp., SEC Litig. Rei. 17748, 2002 SEC LEXIS 2448
(Sept. 26, 2002).
46. Meinhardt, supra note 38.
47. !d.
48. See Jayne W. Barnard, Creative Sanctions for Online Investment Fraud, 76
MISS. L.J. 949 (2007) (detailing some recent fraudulent schemes involving the sale of
securities over the Internet).
49. See infra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
50. SEC v. Sharp, SEC Litig. Rei. 10028, 1983 SEC LEXIS 1505 (June 10, 1983).
51. SEC v. Sharp, SEC Litig. Rei. I 0334, 1984 SEC LEXIS 1834 (Apr. 6, 1984).
52. Arizona v. Sharp, SEC Litig. Rei. 12350, 1990 SEC LEXIS 148 (Jan. 17, 1990).
53. FTC v. Sharp, 782 F. Supp. 1445 (D. Nev. 1991).
54. !d.
55 . In re Sharp, Exchange Act Release No. 48,071,80 S.E.C. 1510 (June 20, 2003).
According to the Commission's complaint, Sharp falsely claimed that PPA was a nonprofit organization created to assist investors, particularly retirees and senior citizens, in
HeinOnline -- 113 Penn St. L. Rev. 197 2008-2009
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The SEC initiated a civil enforcement action against Sharp and he
ultimately consented to the entry of an obey-the-law injunction. 56 He
also agreed to pay a $120,000 civil penalty and to be barred from
associating with any broker or dealer. 57
These three stories, selected from the scores of securities fraud
recidivists whose cases have been handled by the SEC in the past I 0
years, share some characteristics: (I) relocation from venue to venue; (2)
generation of new schemes; (3) the repeated (and obviously ineffective)
use by the SEC of civil sanctions; (4) a shifting mix of civil sanctions,
with an emphasis on fines and "obey-the-law" injunctions; and (5) only
occasional (and often belated) criminal prosecution.
III. WHO ARE THESE PEOPLE?
Not much is known about securities fraud recidivists as no one has
studied this population systematically. Still, it is possible to cobble
together some sense of who these people are, what they value, and how
they operate. They are, in a nutshell, thieves, liars, and career criminals.
They are also successful con artists.
First, they are thieves. To understand thieves, one might look to
ethnological studies of recidivist robbers, burglars, and "fences" that
emphasize trade craft and associational ties. 58 Yet, securities fraud
recidivists are more than just thieves. Their work involves both theft and
deception. So, we might look to the many recent studies of lying and
liars. 59 Every day we learn more about the ways in which liars deceive

finding safe and secure investments providing "heightened" returns. The complaint
further alleged that Sharp falsely represented that the limited partnership investment was
extremely safe (comparing it to "gold in Fort Knox") and would provide a "very secure"
I 6% annual return because it had an "iron-clad" $81.1 million contract with another
company to purchase the matured trees. The complaint also alleged that Sharp arranged
for investors to direct individual retirement account funds to the PPA investment. !d.
56. SEC v. Pension Plans of America, Inc., SEC Litig. Rei. 18140,2003 SEC LEXIS
1195 (May 16, 2003).
57. /d.
58. See, e.g., NEAL SHOVER, GREAT PRETENDERS: PuRSUITS AND CAREERS OF
PERSISTENT THIEVES ( 1996) (describing the practices of robbers and burglars); DARRELL
J. STEFFENSMEIER & JEFFREY T. ULMER, CONFESSIONS OF A DYING THIEF:
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL CAREERS AND ILLEGAL ENTERPRISE (2005) (describing the
practices of property "fences").
59. See, e.g., CHARLES V. FORD, LIES!, LIES!!, LIES!!! THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DECEIT
(1996); DAVID LIVINGSTON SMITH, WHY WE LIE: THE EVOLUTIONARY ROOTS OF
DECEPTION AND THE UNCONSCIOUS MIND (2004); LYING AND DECEPTION IN EVERYDAY
LIFE, (Michael Lewis & Carolyn Saarni eds., l993); EVELIN SULLIVAN, THE CONCISE
BOOK OF LYING (200 I).
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their victims (in many contexts), and also ways to detect deception. 60 I
will discuss the particular skills involved in lying in Part III.C.2.
In addition to being thieves and liars, securities fraud recidivists are
career white collar offenders. Therefore, we might look to studies of
such offenders generally, 61 theoretical accounts of their motives and
behavior, 62 useful statistics, 63 biographies and profiles, 64 and some (more
or less candid) autobiographies. 65
One useful study of 155 "career" securities law violators makes
clear that these offenders are mostly white men. 66 Of the group studied,
99.4 percent were white and 99.4 percent were male. Their median age
was forty-four. 67 Eighty percent of these violators were married, 61.4
percent of them owned their own home, and 39.4 percent of them had at
least a college degree. 68 Twenty-five percent of them had been arrested
for something at least once before committing their first securities law
violation. 69
This general portrait, while useful, especially as regards the race and
gender of securities fraud recidivists, doesn't provide a very detailed

60. See, e.g., Ursula Hess & Robert E. Kleck, Differentiating Emotion Elicited and
Deliberate Emotional Facial Expressions, in WHAT THE FACE REVEALS: BASIC AND
APPLIED STUDIES OF SPONTANEOUS EXPRESSION USING THE FACIAL ACTION CODING
SYSTEM (FACS) 272 (Paul Ekman & Erika L. Rosenberg eds., 2d ed. 2005) (discussing
some of the "markers" of deception, such as blinking, pupil dilation, change in pitch,
speech errors and speech hesitations); ALDERT YRIJ, DETECTING LIES AND DECEIT: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF LYING AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE, Parts I, III
(2000) (discussing the non-verbal indicators of deception and mechanisms for detecting
them); LAURENCE R. TANCREDI, HARDWIRED BEHAVIOR: WHAT NEUROSCIENCE REVEALS
ABOUT MORALITY 121-23 (2005) (describing so-called "brain fingerprinting," which can
reveal at a high level of accuracy whether a subject is lying).
61. See, e.g., DAVID WEISBURD, ELIN WARING, & ELLEN CHAYET, WHITE COLLAR
CRIME AND CRIMINAL CAREERS (2001) [hereinafter WEISBURD ET AL.].
62. See, e.g., NEAL SHOVER & ANDY HOCHSTETLER, CHOOSING WHITE COLLAR
CRIME (2005); RATIONAL CHOICE AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR: RECENT RESEARCH AND
FUTURE CHALLENGES (Alex R. Piquero & Stephen G. Tibbetts eds., 2002) [hereinafter
RATIONAL CHOICE AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR].
63. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, MEASURING RECIDIVISM: THE CRIMINAL HISTORY
COMPUTATION OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES (2004), http://www.ussc.gov/
publicat/Recidivism_General. pdf.
64. See, e.g., STEVE MCVICKER, I LOVE YOU PHILLIP MORRIS: A TRUE STORY OF
LIFE, LOVE AND PRISON BREAKS (2003); GEOFFREY WOLFF, THE DUKE OF DECEPTION:
MEMORIES OF MY FATHER ( 1979).
65. See, e.g., JORDAN BELFORT, THE WOLF OF WALL STREET (2007); MARK
BOROVITZ, THE HOLY THIEF: A CON MAN'S JOURNEY FROM DARKNESS TO LIGHT (2004).
66. WEISBURD ET AL., supra note 61. "Career" or "chronic offenders" were defined
as those with a record of three or more arrests. !d. at 52.
67. !d. at 25, Table 1.1.
68. !d.
69. !d. at 29, Table 2.2.
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picture of them. Thus, we must turn to their fourth dimension-their
identity as con men.

A.

Con Men-Some Basics

Con men have been with us from the dawn of history. Deception
for profit appears in Greek mythology/ 0 Biblical stories, 71 Chinese folk
tales, 72 African legends, 73 and Dickens' novels. 74 Many of history's con
men share common traits.
To begin with, all con men are manipulators. They design their
actions to shape the actions of others:
Manipulators-people who score high in Machiavellianism or social
adroitness-frequently tell self-oriented lies; tend to persist in lying
when they are challenged to tell the truth; do not feel uncomfortable
when they lie; do not find lying cognitively too complicated; view
others cynically; show little concern for conventional morality; and
openly admit that they will lie, cheat, and manipulate others in order
75
to get what they want.

Second, con men typically exhibit highly developed cognitive skills:
Lying can be a cognitively complex task. A liar has to think of
plausible answers; should not contradict him - or herself; should tell a

70. See MICHAEL FARQUHAR, A TREASURY OF DECEPTION: LIARS, MISLEADERS,
HOODWINKERS, AND THE EXTRAORDINARY TRUE STORIES OF HISTORY'S GREATEST
HOAXES, FAKES, AND FRAUDS app. III (2005) (exploring "ten classic deceptions from
Greek mythology").
71. See GENESIS 27 (recounting how Jacob deceived his father, Isaac, in order to
receive a blessing intended for his brother, Esau); GENESIS 29 (recounting how Laban
deceived Jacob in order to ensure that Jacob married Laban's older, less desirable
daughter, Leah, rather than his younger, more beautiful daughter, Rachel).
72. See LEO T AK-HUNG CHAN, THE DISCOURSE ON FOXES AND GHOSTS: JI YUN AND
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY LITERATI STORYTELLING 296-7 (1998) (recounting the story of a
Confucian scholar who misled his neighbor into thinking his house was haunted by
demons in order to purchase the house at a low price. In this cautionary tale, the
Confucian scholar was found out and beaten for his deceit.).
73. See The Foolish Boy, in LION AND THE OSTRICH CHICKS 60 (1986) (retold by
Ashley Bryan) (recounting the story of Spider Ananse, who tried to trick the young boy
Jumoke out of his rightful share of gazelle meat, but was bested by Jumoke). Spider
Ananse, also known as Kweku Ananse, appears in stories from Ghana, Togo, and Ivory
Coast. In Nigeria, he goes by the name of Gizo. MARTIN BENNETT, WEST AFRICAN
TRICKESTER TALES, Author's Note (1994). "Spider" stories, and tales of his comeuppance, appear throughout the volume WEST AFRJCAN FOLKTALES (Richard Sears ed.,
1991).
74. See CHARLES DICKENS, GREAT EXPECTATIONS (1861) (portraying Compeyson,
the man who jilted Miss Havisham minutes before their wedding, as a professional
swindler); CHARLES DICKENS, DAVID COPPERFIELD (1850) (portraying Uriah Heep as a
"forger and a cheat").
75 . VRIJ,supranote60,at 14-15.
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lie that is consistent with everything that the observer knows or might
find out; and should avoid making slips of the tongue. Moreover,
they have to remember what they have said, so that they can say the
same things when someone asks them to repeat their story. 76

Third, con men must have highly-refined interpersonal skills-the
ability to persuade, cajole, shame, excite, calm, and continually re-focus
their victims during the course of the fraud. Among other skills, they
must be acutely sensitive to their victim's state of mind:
[S]killed lying involves convincing the listener that the speaker
believes what he or she is saying and has a truthful intention. A
skilled liar also continuously "reads" the listener's nonverbal
behavior and, in response to "feedback" from the listener, adjusts
both verbal and nonverbal communications to be more credible. This
skill markedly enhances one's capacity to manipulate other people's
77
beliefs and behaviors.

In short, con men, especially those involved in face-to-face
schemes, are manipulative actors with superior cogmttve and
interpersonal skills. It is little wonder that they are thought to be the elite
of the criminal underworld, revered for their artistry, sharpness, and
guile. 78
B.

Classic Studies of Con Men

Scholars have long been fascinated by con men. Over the years,
scholars in several disciplines-including criminologists, psychologists,
and linguists-have studied this group. Beginning with a benchmark
American study in the 1930s and continuing through very recent
neuroimaging studies, we have come to know quite a bit about the
folkways and values ofthese men.
1.

Conwell

In 193 7, a con man named Chic Conwell wrote an extended essay
on life in "the rackets." 79 Conwell's manuscript made its way into the
76. !d. at 26.
77. FORD, supra note 59, at 27; see also SMITH, supra note 59, at 105-06 ("The
effective deceiver must be able to track others' responses on a moment-to-moment basis,
adjusting his or her tactics based on a steady stream of perceptual feedback."); id. at 5
("[I]t is not possible for a person to hoodwink another without keenly observing and
interpreting the reactions of the other from one moment to the next.").
78. FORD, supra note 59, at 158 ("Con artists are known as the aristocrats of the
criminal world.").
79. CHIC CONWELL, THE PROFESSIONAL THIEF: BY A PROFESSIONAL THIEF (annotated
by Edwin H. Sutherland) ( 193 7).
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hands of Edwin Sutherland, the criminologist who coined the phrase
"white collar crime." 80 By interviewing other con men of the day,
Sutherland was able to verify the accuracy of Conwell's descriptions,
and, by sprinkling footnotes and scholarly references throughout
Conwell's text, he was able to tum the book into a study of sociological
value.
Conwell had much to say about the characteristics of con men,
especially those engaged in the elaborate stock frauds typical of his era. 81
According to Conwell:
[t]he con, or confidence game, has many angles, but the central
principle in all true con rackets is to show a sucker how he can make
some money by dishonest methods and then beat him in his
attempted dishonesty. For this, it is necessary to be a good actor, a
good salesman, and have good manners and a good appearance. 82

The principle characteristics of a successful con man, Conwell said,
are "wits, front, and talking ability."83
Like any business person, a con man must be entrepreneurial and
find a market for his product. 84 He then must be patient and cultivate his
customer(s). 85 He must also, however, be wary of each encounter with
his customer:
It is evident that one of the personal characteristics of the thief is

extreme suspicion. This may be accounted for by the fact that he
exists in a suspicious world. While grifting, every move he makes
and every word he utters are carefully guarded to avert suspicion.
The first thing in his mind in every touch is whether he is under
suspicion, and, if he is capable, he has learned to determine this by a
glance. 86

80. See Edwin H. Sutherland, White Collar Criminality, 5 AM. Soc. REv. I (1940).
81. CONWELL, supra note 79, at 61 (describing the "stock market" con in detail).
These types of frauds, and frauds like the phony betting parlor in The Sting, don't exist
anymore. Others-Ponzi schemes, the promotion of worthless penny stocks, tips said to
be based on inside information, and get-rich-quick schemes involving "can't miss"
offerings of stock-are still around.
82. !d. at 56.
83. /d. at 197-98.
84. /d. at 57 ("The first part of the wire racket is to pick out the sucker [the con man]
want[s] to beat."); id. at 70 ("Of course, we select our prospects. We look over his bank
account, his family life, the way he spends his money .... We try to find someone who is
living beyond his means, who has social ambitions, or whose wife has social ambitious
which are beyond their income.").
85. /d. at 56 (in complex frauds, "the sucker may be kept keyed up for several
days.").
86. /d. at 168-69.
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The con man, of course, must not become sentimental about his
victim:
In general, the professional thief does not have any attitude toward
his victim. The victims are just means to an end, the possessors of
wealth which the thief desires. He attempts to get the wealth without
any consideration of the victim. The victims are thought of just like a
fisherman thinks of a place to fish or a hunter of a place to hunt. 87

In short, Conwell concluded, working the con "[is] a business ...
much like ... any other business." 88 It is not a game or a contest with a
winner:
It involves as much hard work as any other business. There is little
thrill about it. While a job is being pulled off, there is a tense and
emotional situation, and the work cannot be routine. From the start
of the actual mechanics of taking off a score until it is completed, the
thief is under a strain caused by suspicion, fear of a tumble ... saying
the right thing at the right time, thought of whether his partners will
perform properly, retention of composure, appearance of
nonchalance, hard thinking and other things. . . . It is no more
thrilling than the work of the factory slave; in both there may be a
feeling of work well done when it is over, but this is different from
the thrill of a horse race. 89

And, at the end of a con, the con man must take care to submerge
his ego. He cannot seek public recognition of his accomplishments, e.g.,
his theft, and he must forego the pleasures of receiving positive
feedback. 90 The best con men are those who are invisible and whose
victims do not even realize they have been conned.

87. /d. at 174. Conwell uses other metaphors to describe the con man's feelings, or
lack thereof, for his victims.
[A con man must] enter into intimate association with [his victims]. This
intimacy is cold-blooded. The feelings are expressed as by an actor on a stage,
with calculations of the results they will produce. He is like a salesman who
attempts to understand a prospective customer only as a means of breaking
down sales resistance and realizing his own objective of increased sales.
/d. at 208.
88. /d. at 140.
89. /d.
90. But see id. at 211 (discussing the importance of recognition among
"professional" thieves).
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Maurer

The second classic study of con men was written by the
distinguished linguist David W. Maurer. 91 Maurer had studied the
colorful language patterns of safe-crackers, pot smokers, pickpockets,
moonshiners, prostitutes, and pimps. 92 He also devoted several years of
his career to conducting linguistic fieldwork among a group of American
con men.
Maurer's study was largely devoted to exploring the language and
mechanics of "big" cons (elaborate schemes involving the establishment
of fake betting parlors or brokerage offices, the use of multiple
participants, and, often, the bribery of public officials to keep the police
away). It also, however, examined con men's values and techniques.
Maurer focused on these men's keen sense of professionalism; 93
avoidance of alcohol while on the job; 94 the need to be well-read and upto-date on cultural and other current events in order to portray
themselves as respectable people with whom a mark would choose to do
business; 95 their zest for innovation and new schemes, 96 and, often, their
addiction to gambling. 97 Maurer's con men, like Conwell's, were
technocrats in their work life-focused, skilled, and disciplined
entrepreneurs.
3.

Blum

A third study of con men emerged in 1972. This study, conducted
by psychologist Richard Blum, was based on in-depth interviews with
fourteen con men in Califomia. 98 In addition to many rich quotes from
91. DAVID W. MAURER, THE BIG CON: THE STORY OF THE CONFIDENCE MAN (Anchor
ed. 1999) (1940).
92. Luc Sante, Introduction to MAURER, supra note 91, at ix.
93. MAURER, supra note 91, at 172 ("The confidence man extends himself fully
while he works; all his faculties and abilities are called into play; each mark is a new
challenge to his ingenuity; and, perhaps most important, the stakes for which he plays are
very high.").
94. !d. at 188 ("[N]o competent con man drinks on the job, and drinking with the
mark is always frowned upon.").
95. !d. at 186 ("They must be well informed in business and financial mattes, have a
glib knowledge of society gossip, and enough of an acquaintance with art, literature, and
music to give an illusion of culture.").
96. !d. at 203 ("[The con man] loves his work and is constantly experimenting to see
what new angle he may develop, what technical point he can improve upon.").
97. !d. at 180 ("[M]ost con men gamble heavily with the money for which they work
so hard and take such chances to secure.").
98. See RICHARD H. BLUM, DECEIVERS AND DECENED: OBSERVATIONS ON
CONFIDENCE MEN AND THEIR VICTIMS, INFORMANTS AND THEIR QUARRY, POLITICAL AND
INDUSTRIAL SPIES AND ORDINARY CITIZENS ( 1972).
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the subjects themselves about their work, Blum's study included
observations about these men's inner lives. First, "profit-making is but
one of the motives to be inferred in the confidence man. Confidence
men are also busy acting out their fantasied desires to be (or more
accurately, to appear to others to be) persons of importance."99 They
also wish to be perceived as "generous, risk-taking, pleasure-loving,
[and] free-and-easy" individuals. 100 Thus, con men must create and then
sustain an attractive, often charismatic character around which to
construct their stories.
According to Blum, the con men he interviewed were sociable, and
took great satisfaction in talking and in being with others.101 They were
also perceptive in their ability to assess potential victims' receptivity to
their schemes, often sizing up a potential victim in just a few minutes 102
and sometimes "almost instantaneously." 103 Furthermore, the typical
relationship between a con man and his victim was not just a one-way
street of exploitation. According to Blum, a con man plays multiple
roles in the victim's life, including "antidepressant" and "fantasy
machine." 104
[The con man] is more than a story-teller . .. for he is a magician
who guides the victim into a world of pleasant dreams. Those
dreams are not solely of the future, the bait of money, or joy at some
later time, but are in the present, for it is in the present moment that
there occurs the hope, the excitement, the dispelled loneliness and the
sense of importance in association with [sic] prestigeful men (the con
man wearing his mask), which constitute the early returns on the
105
victim's investment in the con man.

In many respects, these three classic studies of con men-the oldest
study is now more than 70 years old-are excellent descriptions of many
con men today.106 Little has changed in their values and skill sets. But,
it is possible to define more specifically just what skills are required for
99. /d. at 13.
100. !d.
I OJ. !d. at 53.
102. !d. at 24-26 (describing the process of finding, selecting, approaching, and
"qualifying" victims).
I 03. !d. at 5 I.
104. !d. at 60.
105. !d. at 17.
I 06. Some recent studies of con men add some interesting twists to these profiles.
See, e.g., Jeffrey H. Doocy et al., Telemarketing fraud: Who are the tricksters and what
makes them trick?, 14 SECURITY J. 7 (2001) (noting the importance to the subjects of the
"power" element involved in their schemes- "impos[ing] one's will upon another person
and [obtaining] a measurable financial award for doing so"); Neal Shover et al., Crime on
the Line: Telemarketing and the Changing Nature of Professional Crime, 43 BRJT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 489 (2003) (noting the subjects' great pride in their salesmanship skills).
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success in this trade. Today, through modern neuroimaging techniques,
it is even possible to capture a picture of the con man's brain.

C.

The Con Man's Toolkit

Classic con men, those involved in face-to-face schemes, need an
array of specific skills to succeed. In the next few pages, I will explore
those skills in some detail. 107 The point of this exercise is to illustrate the
remarkable overlap between a con man's methods and his psychological
makeup. A review of the con man's toolkit strongly suggests a
biological component to the successful execution of many fraud
schemes.
1.

Intellectual Agility

The first prerequisite for a successful con man is to be intellectually
agile. He must be good with words, capable of constructing a plausible
story, capable of communicating it with a sense of sincerity (and
sometimes urgency), and capable of keeping the "line" of his story in his
head. All frauds require heightened literary skills.
Moreover, a con man must do more than just write and recite his
lines. He must be able to compose and execute a comprehensive fraud
"script." 108 A retail-level securities fraud must, at a minimum, include
targeting the victim, building rapport, "setting the hook," extracting the
cash, putting the cash out of reach, and taking steps to delay or avert
detection. Elaborate frauds may also include the construction of a
plausible business model, enlistment of confederates, negotiations with
multiple investors, sophisticated documentation, trans-boundary
transmission of funds, and sometimes relocation to avoid arrest.
Not only must the con man compose and deliver the fraud "script,"
he must also be able to improvise. He must have both verbal agility (the
ability to shift ideas quickly in response to changing circumstances) and
narrative imagination (the ability to extemporize and fill in the details of
a story to give it verisimilitude). Like any good novelist, a con man must
107. The model here is STEFFENSMEIER & ULMER, CONFESSIONS OF A DYING THIEF,

supra note 58, at 127-37, which identifies the necessary skills for a "criminal
entrepreneur" as follows: "heart;" inventiveness; scheming; ingenuity; practical
knowledge of things, language, and people; street smarts, worldly-wiseness; social skills;
larceny sense (an "eye for clipping"); business skills and knowledge; trustworthiness
("being solid"); and "muscle."
108. Just as with every crime, committing a fraud involves a sequence of actions:
preparation; target selection, initiation of action, completion of the scheme, exit from the
setting, disposal of evidence, etc. This is known as the fraud "script." See Derek B.
Cornish & Ronald V. Clark, Analyzing Organized Crimes, in RATIONAL CHOICE AND
CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 62, at 46.
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create a compelling protagonist, an engaging plot line, and a powerful
ending.
2.

Skills in Deception

A second key factor in a con man's success, at least for those
involved in face-to-face schemes, is the ability to lie effectively over a
sustained period of time. "Lying takes a lot of effort," observes a
neuroscientist involved in a study of pathological liars. 109 "It's almost
mind reading. You have to be able to understand the mindset of the
other person. You also have to suppress your emotions or regulate them
because you don't want to appear nervous. There's quite a lot to do
there."IIO
Often, inexperienced liars fail at this effort. They may reveal their
deception by "a change in the expression on the face, a movement of the
body, an inflection to the voice, a swallowing in the throat, a very deep
or shallow breath, long pauses between words, a slip of the tongue, a
micro facial expression, or a gestural slip. ,III
These failures may be due to cognitive shortfall-failure to
anticipate when it will be necessary to lie, inventing a story that is
inadequate to changing circumstances, or failure to remember the story
one has adopted. 112 Alternatively, deceit may be betrayed by one's
emotions-fear of detection ("detection apprehension") or feelings of
guilt ("deception guilt").IIJ Some liars may even unwittingly reveal their
pleasure in "hooking" the victim (this is known as "duper's delight").II 4
All of these factors can cause what is known as "leakage"-subtle
behavioral clues that alert the victim that something is not right. IIs Good
con men minimize leakage and maximize the credibility of their lies.
3.

Skills in Building Trust

A skill closely related to the ability to deceive is the ability to
project trustworthiness or "believability." An effective fraud relies on
the victim's belief that the defrauder is telling a true story. There is some
109. Usha Sutliff, Liars' Brains Wired Differently, http://www.usc.edu/uscnews/
stories/11655.html (last visited July 29, 2008) (quoting Adrian Raine, a leader in the
study of the neuroscience of lying).
110. !d.
Ill. Paul Ekman & Mark G. Frank, Lies That Fail, in LYING AND DECEPTION IN
EVERYDAY LIFE, supra note 59, at 184.
112. !d. at 185.
113. !d. at 189-94.
114. !d. at 194-95.
115. Of course, some victims are more sensitive than others to the presence of
leakage; some are immediately put on alert while others suppress their sense of unease.
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suggestion that believability may have some anatomical characteristics.
That is, "some people look more honest than others and thus can lie more
effectively." 116 It is also clear that persons lacking a conventional
conscience betray their untrustworthiness less than others with a betterdeveloped conscience. That is, they have "a decreased capacity to
develop conditioned autonomic nervous system response (e.g., sweating,
increased heart rate, and muscular tension) to adverse stimuli." 117
"Because their lies are not associated with guilt, there are fewer bodily
symptoms to betray the deceit to the target of the lie." 118
There are several techniques involved in establishing trust. Some
liars may attempt to diffuse their victim's mistrust by modeling "'honest
behavior' (looking the victim straight in the eyes, avoiding fidgeting and
so on) as soon as they realize that they are mistrusted by the people they
are trying to dupe." 119 A more important mechanism for building trust is
the exploitation of associational ties. 120 Another is to sprinkle a story
with "irrelevant or extraneous information, some of which the [victim]
will know to be true and [therefore] make the story sound more
convincing." 121 Another is to anticipate the victim's skepticism or fear
and defuse it. "The skillful con artist learns to disarm suspicions by
bringing them up first. ... " 122
Still another technique conducive to "believability" has to do with
listening. 123 To be successful, a con man must engage a prospective
victim in enough conversation to reveal the mark's economic
preferences. Engaging the victim requires patience, prompting, and (at
least a simulation of) empathy. Stated another way, the con man must be
willing to spend time listening to his victim's hopes, aspirations, dreams,
and desires, in order to determine the shape of his sales pitch. Then, he
must build a relationship, foster confidence, and know precisely when to
make the "ask." All of these skills, of course, are the same skills

116. FORD, supra note 59, at 66.
117. !d. at 109-1 10.
118. I d. at II 0 (citation omitted).
119. VRIJ, supra note 60, at 52.
120. See. e.g., SEC v. Lukens, SEC Litig. Rei. 17218, 2001 SEC LEXIS 2311 (Nov.
2, 2001) (describing fraud by a defendant whose victims were members of his church);
SEC v Focus Financial Associates, SEC Litig. Rei. 19259,2005 SEC LEXIS 1363 (June
9, 2005) (describing fraud by a defendant who preyed on members of the HaitianAmerican community).
121. FORD, supra note 59, at 159.
122. /d.
123. One con man has described the importance of listening to his victims. "I'm
persuasive because I understand and listen to people. I study everything about a person.
No detail is too small. People love to talk, and I love to listen. Listening to a person talk
is the key to being able to outwit them." McVICKER, supra note 64, at 139 (quoting
Steve Russell, the subject of the book).
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required of any good salesman. For con men, however, the "product" is
a scam.
4.

"Heart" and "Larceny Sense"

Another attribute of a successful con man is "heart"-a combination
of "nerve" and "coolness." 124 A con man must face the possibility of
detection and arrest, or worse, and yet, despite these risks, must be able
to carry on with his business as if nothing were at stake. The ability to
do this is highly-prized in the underworld:
"Most people could never hack it" is a common statement of
seasoned thieves, in reference to the dangers, risks, and physical
demands inherent in a criminal lifestyle. To gain respect or to recruit
associates, the thief or illegal entrepreneur must demonstrate that he
has "heart." "Heart" is a set of traits, a combination of physical and
mental toughness, of courage and coolness. To have heart is to be
someone who does not scare easily and who is able to perform at
one's best when the stakes are high and the risks great. The ability to
keep cool, remain in control, and exercise fast-action judgments in
situations that are unpredictable and suspenseful are highly valued
work skills. Having these skills contributes to status and respect in
the underworld for those who possess them. As with most work
125
skills, they can become something that one is proud of.

A successful con man also needs "larceny sense," a term originally
coined by Chic Conwell to encompass the ability to assess risk, evaluate
alternatives, and select an appropriate course of action. 126
5.

Business Savvy

In addition to "heart" and "larceny sense," a successful con man
must also have some sense of business and business practices. He needs
to plausibly describe why a start-up company is likely to succeed where
others have failed, or to persuade his victims that a listing on the
NASDAQ is imminent. He needs to identify (in order to exploit) topical
themes in constructing his fraudulent schemes. 127 He may need to deal

124. STEFFENSMEIER & ULMER, supra note 58, at 129.
125. !d.
126. CONWELL, supra note 79, at 32.
127. See, e.g., SEC v. Cyberkey Solutions, Inc., SEC Litig. Rel. 20049, 2007 SEC
LEXIS 515 (Mar. 20, 2007) (describing defendants' sales of securities in a firm alleged to
have lucrative contracts with the Department of Homeland Security); SEC v. 2DoTrade,
Inc., SEC Litig. Rel. 19635, 2006 SEC LEXIS 737 (Mar. 31 , 2006) (describing a pumpand-dump scheme based on the company's purported development of an anthrax-resistant
compound).
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with landlords, vendors, Internet service providers, and international
bankers. Additionally, con men often have to manage other employees.
6.

The Ability to "Read" One's Victims

As important as all the foregoing skills, a successful con man must
have an ability to recognize, encourage, and exploit his victims' greed.
With very little information, he must be able to distinguish between those
targets likely to part with their money in response to an attractive
investment opportunity and those who are too risk-averse to waste his
time on. Victim-selection is an intuitive art. 128
Having selected his victim, a con man must then identify the buttons
to push to get the victim to actually make an investment decision. This
ability, too, requires sensitivity and intuition. 129 "Any lie custom-tailored
to [the victim's) psychological makeup and biases, any lie that feeds
vanity, jealousy, fear of rejection, or any of the ten thousand other
goblins making merry in the twisted hallways of [the victim's brain), will
be compelling in a way in which few other things are." 130
Thus, a key to a successful fraud scheme is the identification and
manipulation of victims who are particularly vulnerable to a con man's
persuasive skills. 131
7.

Lack of Empathy

During the course of a fraud scheme, it is important that the con
man not be distracted by compassion or generosity toward his victims.
The con man's empathy deficit, in fact, is one of the ironies of a
128. See supra note I 03 and accompanying text.
129. See MARTIN KANTOR, THE PSYCHOPATHY OF EVERYDAY LIFE: How ANTISOCIAL
PERSONALITY DISORDER AFFECTS ALL OF US I 04 (2006).
[One successful telemarketer] seemed to know intuitively who ached to be
complimented, and would flatter them in order to "get them eating out of his
hands." Likewise, he knew who ached to be abused, and would put them
down, secure in the knowledge that they would do almost anything to tum
things around to get into his good graces. He was particularly adept at
uncovering the loneliness of old people and how their desire to please him in
order to get at least a few drops of kindness left them unprotected. In short,
like most psychopathic individuals, he did not so much feel for others as he felt
his way into them.
!d. (emphasis in original).
130. SULLIVAN, supra note 59, at I 08.
131. Arguably, we all are vulnerable to being conned. "We all need manipulative con
artists. They offer us all hope. They fan the flames of our fading desires and our tired
imaginations. They stoke the fires of our secret, and often sinful, passions." KANTOR,
supra note 129, at 47. Some of us, though, are more vulnerable to manipulation than
others. The ability to sort us out is one factor that distinguishes a "successful" con man
from those who fail.
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successful fraud-victims must sense an emotional connection with their
defrauder and yet the defrauder must not feel any emotional connection
with his victims. At a minimum, this principle means that a con man
must view his victim as a neutral object, akin to a "fish" at the end of his
line. 132 Sometimes, con men achieve the necessary distance from their
victims by convincing themselves that they are mentally superior to their
victims 133 or that the victims are just as scheming and dishonest as their
defrauders. 134
8.

Lack of Remorse

A final "skill" that is essential for a successful con man is the ability
to walk away from a victim without regret or remorse. To be effective,
con men must rationalize or "neutralize" the harm that they do, 135 and the
courts are full of fraud defendants who, even when confronted with the
likelihood of a long term in prison, deny the illegality of their conduct,
minimize its significance, or seek to place the blame on somebody
else. 136
9.

The Bottom Line

Con men exhibit the common psychological characteristics of any
person engaged in a fraud-a quest for power over another person and an
ability to rationalize or "neutralize" their conduct. 137 They also exhibit
the specific characteristics of those who engage repeatedly in cruel acts:
lack of empathy, lack of remorse, and a general lack of "conventional
conscience." 138 Con men who deal with their victims face-to-face "[are]
perhaps the most seriously disturbed [of all con men] due to the
requirement for often quite intimate personal betrayal." 139 "They are an

132. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
133. Grace Duffield & Peter Grabosky, The Psychology of Fraud, at 2 (Australian
Institute of Criminology, Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice No. 199,
2001), http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/tandi/til99.pdf (noting that part of the
"delight" experienced by a con man is the ability to demonstrate his superiority).
134. /d. at 3 (noting that generating a dislike and Jack of respect for the victim "makes
it easier to treat them badly").
135. !d.
136. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 458 F.3d 491 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting, in a bank
fraud case, that the defendant had failed to show remorse for his crime); United States v.
King, 454 F.3d 187 (3rd Cir. 2006) (same); United States v. Schwartz, 379 F. Supp. 2d
716 (E. D. Pa. 2007) (discussing the defendant's Jack of remorse in a case involving wire
fraud, bank fraud and identity theft).
137. Duffield & Grabosky, supra note 133, at 2-3.
138. !d. at 4-5.
139. /d. at 5.
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unusually sick group in terms of mental health and an unusually
antisocial group in terms of lack of regard for others." 140
D.

Skills Required in the Internet Age

One might surmise that some of the skills discussed in Part III.C.
are no longer necessary, as frauds can now succeed without any human
contact between a con man and his victims. For example, a recent fraud
involved so-called "auto-surfing," in which victims made their way to a
website (www.12dailypro.com) that promised to pay them to visit
various other websites that were interested in building their "click
count." Victims were asked to pay a fee to join this program, and, as in
any Ponzi scheme, early participants really did receive compensation for
their website visits. Soon, though, the program outstripped its capacity
to keep making payments, and the $50 million scheme collapsed. 141 The
entire interaction between the defendant and her victims (some 300,000
victims worldwide) was impersonal-no visits, no phone calls, no
"presentation of self." 142
Similarly, thousands of investors have
purchased into spam-based pump-and-dump schemes without ever being
contacted by a securities salesman. 143
Others have purchased
unregistered securities based solely on what they read on a website. 144
Thus, some of the traditional fraud skills, such as mental agility,
glibness, and the ability to mask one's emotions, are not relevant to an
Internet con man's success. "Nerve" and "coolness" may also be
unnecessary where perpetrating a fraud electronically presents little risk
of pursuit or physical harm.
Other skills, though, are required to successfully commit an Internet
fraud. Of course, these frauds require programming and website-design
skills. 145 Frauds that involve spam e-mails, 146 counterfeit press releases
140. BLUM, supra note 98, at 50.
141. SEC v. Johnson, SEC Litig. Rei. 19579,2006 LEXIS 433 (Feb. 27, 2006).
142. The reference is to the classic ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN
EVERYDAY LIFE (1959).
143. See, e.g., SEC v. Lebed, Exchange Act Release 43307, 2000 LEXIS 1964 (Sept.
20, 2000) (describing the pump-and-dump scheme engineered by a high school student,
who posted pseudonymous endorsements of stock in various Internet chat rooms, and
thereby stimulated purchases of stock that netted him more than $270,000).
144. See, e.g., SEC v. Global Online Direct, Inc., SEC Litig. Rei. 20073, 2007 SEC
LEXIS 708 (Apr. 9, 2007) (describing the online sale of unregistered securities promising
an effective annual return of 1,100 percent).
145. The technical skills required to establish a website and extract payment are
actually some of the less demanding aspects of the job. See Tom Zeller, Jr., Identity Thief
Finds Easy Money Hard to Resist, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2006, at AI. In his article, Zeller
describes the career of a 20-year old man, now in prison, who was able to make
thousands of dollars a day in an Internet-based identity theft scheme. The man reported
that, for him, learning how to steal identities and translate that theft into profit, was easy.
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or analysts' reports that look like they were issued from legitimate
sources, 147 or that involve identity theft and hacking into victims'
customer accounts, 148 may require a somewhat higher level of technical
sophistication than comparable face-to-face schemes. But, none ofthese
schemes are particularly complex. 149
In addition to the technical skills, however, Internet-based securities
frauds require the same kind of story-building skills necessary to succeed
in a face-to-face fraud. Creating an attractive investment scenario-a
"Web portal" scheme through which investors can expect "substantial
passive income," 150 a scheme falsely claiming a leadership role in the
ownership and development of assisted living facilities, 151 or a scheme
promising access to foreign exchange markets with special "interbank"
privileges 152-all require some narrative imagination. The "fraud
scripts" must also be enticing enough to stimulate investor action. 153
With Internet frauds, unlike face-to-face frauds, there is no opportunity
for the con man to build trust through the use of personal charm.
Successful Internet securities frauds require two additional skills:
(1) the ability to manipulate language and images to evade detection in

"The challenge was really stopping, you know? That was the hardest challenge of them
all." /d.
146. See, e.g., SEC v. MegaMania Interactive, Inc., SEC Litig. Rei. 19369,2005 SEC
LEXIS 2315 (Sept. 9, 2005) (describing a scheme involving hundreds of thousands of
unsolicited e-mails ).
147. See, e.g., SEC v. Snyder, SEC Litig. Rei. 46108, 2002 SEC LEXIS 1619 (June
25, 2002) (describing a pump-and-dump scheme in which the defendant posted a phony
news story that looked like it had come from the Bloomberg news service); SEC v. lnv.
Tech., Inc., SEC Litig. Rei. 18970,2004 SEC LEXIS 2624 (Nov. 15, 2004) (describing a
scheme involving phony press releases and analysts' reports).
148. See, e.g., SEC v. Marimuthu, SEC Litig. Rei. 20037, 2007 SEC LEXIS 469
(Mar. 12, 2007) (describing a scheme in which defendants, located in India, "hijacked the
online brokerage accounts of unwitting investors using stolen usernames and passwords,"
then purchased stock for those accounts in a pump-and-dump scheme).
149. Surprisingly, getting a list of likely victims takes no expertise. For example,
"mooch lists" (lists of people who have invested in fraudulent schemes in the past) are
available to anyone willing to pay for them. See Charles Duhig, Bilking the Elderly, With
a Corporate Assist, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2007, at 1.
150. SEC v. Osterhout, SEC Litig. Rei. 19848, 2006 SEC LEXIS 2156 (Sept. 27,
2006).
151. SEC v. Todt, SEC Litig. Rei. 19272,2005 SEC LEXIS 1421 (June 15, 2005).
152. SEC v. First Access Financial, SEC Litig. Rei. 18984, 2004 SEC LEXIS 2715
(Nov. 22, 2004).
153. Interestingly, the need to create plausible, as well as enticing, scenarios may
have declined with the use of the Internet. Many successful Internet schemes involve
"misrepresentations that the reasonable investor would dismiss as absurd." Margaret V.
Sachs, Materiality and Social Change: The Case for Replacing "the Reasonable
Investor" With "the Least Sophisticated Investor" in Inefficient Markets, 81 TuL. L. REv.
473,476 (2006).
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periodic SEC "sweeps" for fraudulent offerings and (2) an instinct for
when to shut the scheme down and move on.
Most importantly, perpetrators of Internet frauds, like perpetrators
of face-to-face schemes, must be ruthless-willing and able to steal the
money of faceless victims with no empathy and no remorse. The people
who do this work well are often some of the smartest, most cunning and
most heartless of offenders. And, they-like perpetrators of face-to-face
frauds-may suffer from a chronic personality disorder.
E.

The Con Man's Brain

Successful con men have many skills and traits in common. Some
of their skills may reflect learned behavior. Importantly, though, many
of their most useful skills and traits manifest themselves in childhood.
These skills and traits are unlikely to be learned, although they can be
cultivated and refined. Many con men, in short, especially those who are
repeat offenders, are probably "hard wired" to commit manipulative
crimes. My hypothesis is that many of these offenders suffer from a
serious psychopathology known as Antisocial Personality Disorder
(APD).
APD is one of ten recognized personality disorders. 154 In general,
APD appears as a "pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the
rights of others." 155
According to the American Psychiatric
Association's diagnostic guidelines, the diagnostic criteria for APD
include three or more of the following items occurring after the age of
fifteen:
• Failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful
behaviors, as indicated by repeatedly performing acts that
are grounds for arrest
• Deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases,
or conning others for personal profit or pleasure

****

154. DUANE K. DOBBERT, UNDERSTANDING PERSONALITY DISORDERS I (2007). A
personality disorder is defined as "an enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior
that deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual's culture, is pervasive and
inflexible, is stable over time, has an onset in adolescence or early adulthood, and leads to
distress or impairment." AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-IV-TR 685 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
!55. DSM-IV, supra note !54, at 706. The public often uses the terms "psychopath"
or "sociopath" to describe individuals with this type of behavior profile. These terms,
however, are not diagnostic conditions recognized in the DSM-IV. See John Monahan, A
Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and
Patients, 92 VA. L. REv. 391,435 n.ll6 (2006).
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•

Consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure
to sustain consistent work behavior or honor financial
obligations
• Lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to, or
rationalizing, having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from
another. 156
"[APD] is characterized by a pattern of "socially irresponsible,
exploitative, and guiltless behavior." 157 The most "salient, severe, and
potentially dangerous" characteristic of the pathology is a lack of
remorse. 158
People with APD (also known as "antisocials") are not antisocial in
the vernacular sense. That is, they don't avoid personal interactions with
others but may, in fact, be highly sociable. However, they "seem to have
fundamentally different emotional and biological responses from others.
For example, researchers have found that subjects with APD have
diminished responses to facial expressions of sadness or fear and that
their response to fear is generally blunted." 159 Brain imaging studies
have shown that the brain structure of antisocials is different from the
brain structure of "normal" persons. 160 Thus, APD seems to have
physical, as well as psychosocial, origins. 161

156. DSM-IV, supra note !54, at 706.
157. DONALD W. BLACK, BAD BOYS, BAD MEN: CONFRONTING ANTISOCIAL
PERSONALITY DISORDER xvi (1999).
!58. DOBBERT, supra note 154, at 60.
159. Richard A. Friedman, M.D., Truth About Lies: They Tell A Lot About a Liar,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2003, at F6.
160. See Adrian Raine eta!., Reduced Prefrontal Gray Matter Volume and Reduced
Autonomic Activity in Antisocial Personality Disorder, 57 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 119
(2000) (finding that persons with APD had II percent less prefrontal gray matter than
control subjects, suggesting that a structural deficit may underlie the low arousal, poor
fear conditioning, lack of conscience, and decision-making deficits that characterize
antisocial behavior); Adrian Raine et a!., Corpus Callosum Abnormalities in
Psychopathic Antisocial Individuals, 60 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1134 (2003) (finding
that antisocial individuals have 22.6 percent more callosal white matter volume than
controls, a finding that might account for affective and interpersonal deficits).
161. Notably, APD is far more prevalent among men than among women. Antisocial
Personality
Disorder,
Psychology
Today
Diagnosis
Dictionary,
http://psychologytoday.com/conditions/antisocial.html (last visited July 29, 2008). APD
occurs in three percent of the male population and only one percent of the female
population.
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APD symptoms typically emerge in childhood 162 and the behaviors
associated with APD ultimately decline with age. 163 In midlife, though, a
person with APD creates havoc in the lives of the people around him.
Sometimes his conduct escalates to violence. 164 More often, he
repeatedly loses jobs, torments his family through lies and broken
promises, and gets in trouble with the police. Not surprisingly, the
consequences of APD in a legal context can be significant. 165
Antisocial personality disorder is a chronic and lifelong problem. 166
"Though the cycle of misbehavior shifts with changes in circumstances,
it remains a force throughout the antisocial's life." 167 Conventional
therapies-lecturing, operant conditioning, financial penalties, shaming,
and familial rejection ("tough love")-are all ineffective in reversing the
effects of APD. 168 According to most experts, it is nearly impossible to
successfully treat APD. 169
Importantly, this means that a person with APD is unlikely to be
deterred from wrongdoing by the threat of legal sanctions:
[Such a person's] lack of conscience enables him to act on impulses
without a second thought and then to repeat the same destructive
behaviors with no regard for their consequences. While antisocials
can understand the concepts of right and wrong on an intellectual
level, they have no emotional connection to commonly held standards

162. Essi Vi ding et a!., Strong Genetic Risk for Psychopathic Syndrome in Children,
46 J. CHILD PSYCH. & PSYCHIATRY 592 (2005) (reporting on a study of 7-year olds who
already show problem behaviors and a significant lack of empathy or remorse).
163. Joshua Greene, Cognitive Neuroscience and the Structure of the Moral Mind, in
THE INNATE MIND: STRUCTURE AND CONTENTS 342 (Stephen Laurence, Peter Carruthers,
& Stephen Stich eds., 2005).
164. BLACK, supra note 157, at 42.
165. The nature of an antisocial's criminal behavior is often a function of his
intelligence. That is,
[t]he level of intelligence of the person afflicted with [APD] is ... reflected in
the type of behaviors that they perform. Generally speaking the higher the
level of intelligence, the more covert the behavior, and in contrast, the lower
the level of the intelligence of the person afflicted with [APD], the more overt
the behavior. The person with lower intelligence is more apt to commit armed
robbery of a convenience store without considering the presence of a
surveillance camera. . . . In contrast the [antisocial] man with a higher
intelligence carefully plans out his criminal activity. He is rarely impulsive and
usually successful. He is good at his trade.
DOBBERT, supra note 154, at 56.
166. /d. at 54.
167. BLACK, supra note 157, at 35.
168. See Jessica H. Lee, The Treatment of Psychopathic and Antisocial Personality
Disorders: A Review, http://www.ramas.co.uk/report3.pdf (last visited July 28, 2008).
169. BLACK, supra note 157, at 12 (many experts regard treatment of APD as
"hopeless").
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of behavior. This conscience deficit is the root of [the disorder's]
170
range of symptoms.

Even conviction and imprisonment may fail to change the conduct of a
person with APD. 171
If it is not already obvious, there is a significant overlap between the
characteristics of a securities fraud recidivist and a person with APD:
illegal behavior, repeated deception, disregard for the rights and property
of others, conning for profit, and lack of remorse. The core characteristic
of a successful con man-the empathy deficit-is also the core
characteristic of a person with APD.
Some securities fraud recidivists may not have APD, of course, but
fall instead into the category of chronic or "pathological" liar. These
people lie about everything: what they ate for breakfast, where they
bought their car, and who they saw at church on Sunday. Their lying is
reflexive, and often pointless; that is, they lie out of habit (or
compulsion) rather than to achieve any particular economic objective. 172
Chronic liars are not well-understood by forensic psychologists, 173 but
we do know that people who are chronic liars, like people with APD,
have a different brain structure than "normal" persons and also a
different brain structure than persons with APD. 174
It is unlikely, in my view, that many securities fraud recidivists are
pathological liars. 175 It is more likely that some securities fraud
recidivists suffer from no pathology but are simply economic
opportunists-clever thieves. This possibility, of course, is consistent

170. !d. at xiii.
171. Id.atxi.
172. Ken Hausman, Does Pathological Lying Warrant Inclusion in DSM?,
PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Jan. 3, 2003, at 24 ("In pathological lying, telling lies may often
seem to be an end in itself.... ").
173. !d. (noting the "paucity of literature references and studies on pathological
lying"). See also Charles C. Dike, et a!., Pathological Lying Revisited, 33 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCH. AND THE LAW 342, 347 (2005) ("It is unknown whether pathological lying exists
across cultures, whether there are different subtypes of the phenomenon, and whether
pathological liars present enough predominant, consistent, and stable symptoms or
symptom clusters to delineate clearly a clinical entity fit for individual classification in
the DSM.").
174. Yaling Yang & Adrian Raine, Prefrontal White Matter in Pathological Liars,
187 BR. J. PSYCHIATRY 320 (2005) (noting that pathological liars have significantly less
gray matter and significantly more white matter than either normal or antisocial control
subjects). Yaling Yang et a!., Localisation of Increased Prefrontal White Matter in
Pathological Liars, 190 BR. J. PSYCHIATRY 174 (2007) (further detailing the distribution
of white matter in pathological liars).
175. Pathological lying may be associated with a number of pathologies other than
APD. These include borderline personality disorder, histrionic personality disorder, or
narcissistic personality disorder. SULLIVAN, supra note 59, at 151.
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with the view of criminologists who embrace the "crime as choice"
. co 11 ar cnme.
°
176
approac h to w h1te
Let us imagine, then, the universe of securities fraud offenders. I
have suggested they might fall into three categories: those suffering from
APD, those who are chronic liars but do not suffer from APD, and those
who have no pathology but choose to engage in fraud, sometimes
repeatedly. We do not know-because we have not asked- just what the
respective size of these populations might be. A fair guess, though (and
it is only a guess at this point), is that, amongfirst offenders, the universe
of securities fraud defendants might look something like this:

0

Offenders with APD

11 Offenders\\1lo itre
Pathological Liars
Cl Offendenmito are
Economically
O})p()J1tmistic

The universe of securities fraud second offenders might look
something like this:

176. See, e.g., SHOVER
CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR, supra

& HOCHSTETLER, supra note 62; RATIONAL CHOICE AND

note 62.
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Pathological Liars
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Finally, let us imagine the universe of securities law offenders who
have been sanctioned at least twice for securities law violations, either in
state or federal proceedings and either in civil or criminal proceedings,
and then recidivate again. The composition of this population might
look something like this:

Offendef8\\1lo are
• Pathological
Liars
Ll

Offenders who are
Economically
Opportunistic

Of course, these estimates are only speculative. Still, if I am
correct, or even close to correct, a significant percentage of securities
fraud recidivists, especially those with multiple frauds on their record,
may suffer from APD. And, even if I am wrong, there still is a
significant problem, discussed below, with the current SEC deterrence
scheme.
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IV. THE TRADITIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO SECURITIES
FRAUD RECIDIVISTS

Retail securities fraud is said to be a "low-risk crime" (for its
perpetrators) because it is so difficult to detect and prosecute. 177 It is also
generally a low-sanction crime. That is, retail securities fraud is usually
handled strictly as a civil matter, utilizing an array of civil remedies.
These include cease-and-desist orders, occupational bars, penny stock
bars, "obey-the-law" injunctions, disgorgement orders, civil penalties,
and occasional asset freezes. 178 The SEC sparingly refers its cases to the
Department of Justice for criminal prosecution. 179
Even cases involving recidivist securities law violators are rarely
prosecuted and often result merely in the imposition of repeated civil
sanctions. We saw this scenario, of course, in the cases of Frank
Custable (whom the SEC pursued three times in civil enforcement
proceedings before he faced federal criminal prosecution), 180 Roc
Hatfield (who was sanctioned three times in civil proceedings, including
after serving time in jail for fraud), 181 and Lloyd Benton Sharp (who has
been enjoined three times but never prosecuted federally). 182 We also see
it with demoralizing regularity in many other cases.
One instructive case (and one of the few fraud cases involving
women) is that of Carol Martino, who orchestrated a stock manipulation
scheme that netted her more than four million dollars. 183 Even though
Martino had once before been enjoined from violating the securities
177. SHOVER, supra note 58, at 57:
First, when compared to those victimized by street crimes, victims of fraud are
much less likely even to be aware they have been victimized. And they are less
likely than victims of street crime to report it to authorities. elieving they
should have been more careful in the first place, many feel a sense of
embarrassment and shame and certainly do not want others to know what has
happened to them. Local-level law enforcement and prosecution generally are
no match for criminals whose operations span state borders via the telephone or
the U.S. mail.
178. The hierarchy of available civil remedies is more fully described in Jayne W.
Barnard, Rule JOb-5 and the "Unfitness" Question, 47 ARIZ. L. REv. II, 32-33 (2005).
179. See Jenni Bergal & Purva Patel, Fraud Outruns the Feds; Investors Lose Almost
$1 Billion in Five Years, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, July 6, 2003, at !A (in a
review of 121 securities fraud cases filed in Miami, "only about 20 percent of the SEC's
cases ... resulted in criminal prosecutions"). A friend at the SEC suggested that this
newspaper article provides meager support for the assertion that few SEC cases are
referred for criminal prosecution. The SEC itself does not provide better information. Its
annual Performance and Accountability Report does not make reference to criminal
referrals.
180. See supra notes 11-27 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 28-4 7 and accompanying text
182. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
183. See SEC v. Martino, 255 F. Supp. 2d 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), aff'd SEC v.
Martino, 94 Fed. Appx. 871 (2d Cir. 2004).
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laws, and barred from associating with any broker, dealer, or investment
adviser, 184 she had continued to do both for several years. She had also
been prosecuted (and jailed) for income tax evasion, and had moved her
assets outside the country to foil creditors. 185 The result for Martino was
a disgorgement order and the imposition of another obey-the-law
injunction.186
Yet another case involves Joel Steinger, who orchestrated the sale
of viatica! settlements valued at over one billion dollars. 187 Even though
Steinger had a history of other securities law violations, and had
consented to the entry of an obey-the-law injunction in a similar scheme
only a few years before, 188 the SEC sought only disgorgement, a civil
penalty, and a second obey-the-law injunction. 189 Steinger was able to
settle the case by consenting to the injunction and disgorging the
proceeds of the scheme. 190
The problem with all these cases is not only that "civil actions
frequently disguise serious criminal conduct," 191 but also that civil
sanctions may present problems of legitimacy 192 and are often inadequate
in terms of victim satisfaction. Most importantly, the civil sanctions
available to the SEC-inconveniences, really-are unlikely to deter
committed recidivists. 193 According to an informal study of securities
fraud violators in Florida in 2003, twenty-five percent of them had "at
184. See 255 F. Supp. 2d at 271.
185. See id. at 290.
186. See id. at 290-91.
187. SEC v. Mutual Benefits Corp., No. 04-60573-civ-Moreno/Garber, 2004 U.S.
Dist LEXIS 23008 (S .D. Fla., Nov, 10, 2004).
188. SEC v. Steinger, SEC Litig. Rei. 15729, 1998 SEC LEXIS 834 (May I, 1998).
189. SEC v. Mutual Benefits Corp., SEC Litig. Rei. 18698, 2004 SEC LEXIS 941
(May 6, 2004).
190. SEC v. Steinger, SEC Litig. Rei. 19480, 2005 SEC LEXIS 3103 (Dec. I, 2005).
See also SEC v. Calvo, 378 F. 3d 1211 (lith Cir. 2004) (recidivist sanctioned with a
disgorgement order, a civil penalty and an obey-the-law injunction); SEC v. U.S.
Windfarming, Inc., SEC Litig. Rei. 19886, 2006 SEC LEXIS 2841 (Oct. 25, 2006)
(recidivist sanctioned with a disgorgement order, penny stock bar, and an obey-the-law
injunction); SEC v. ACI, Inc., SEC Litig. Rei. 18869, 2004 SEC LEXIS 1998 (Sept. 2,
2004) (recidivist sanctioned with a disgorgement order, civil penalty, and an obey-thelaw injunction); SEC v. Rocky Mountain Energy Corp., SEC Litig. Rei. 18305, 2003
SEC LEXIS 2038 (Aug. 22, 2003) (recidivist sanctioned with an obey-the-law
injunction); SEC v. Hayton, SEC Litig. Rei. 17872, 2002 SEC LEXIS 3086 (Dec. 3,
2002) (recidivist sanctioned with disgorgement order and obey-the-law injunction).
191 . SHOVER & HOCHSTETLER, supra note 62, at I 03 .
192. See, e.g., SEC v. Smyth, 420 F.3d 1225, 1233 n.l4 (11th Cir. 2005) (questioning
the legitimacy of obey-the-law injunctions).
193. See, e.g. , Floyd Norris, A White-Collar Criminal Adds Conviction No. 7 to His
Record, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2002, at Cll (noting that the SEC had obtained three obeythe-law injunctions against defendant Lionel Reifler but "his career does not seem to
have been affected by that." Reifler had been "in and out of trouble for various fmancial
crimes for most of his adult life.").
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least one previous regulatory or criminal action involving fraud or
economic crime. Eleven percent had two or more such actions against
them." 194 Several had three or more. 195
Of course, it is understandable that the SEC husbands these cases
for itself rather than referring them to the Department of Justice. This
reluctance may be due to territorialism and a sense that the U.S.
Attorneys' offices are often not very good at prosecuting certain types of
securities frauds. There also may be problems with meeting the beyonda-reasonable-doubt standard necessary to secure a criminal conviction.
Internet frauds are particularly difficult to prosecute: the detailed tracing
of communications through multiple servers and the frequent
involvement of offshore co-conspirators, whose testimony cannot be
compelled, complicate these cases. And, recently, the FBI and federal
prosecutors have been directed to focus on terrorism and drugs, not
fraud. 196 Thus, today, these agencies simply lack the resources to pursue
all but the biggest fish in the securities fraud pool.
Still, where the likelihood of recidivism is high, the SEC should
recognize that something more than repeated civil sanctions may be
required. In the case of documented recidivism, criminal prosecution
will almost always be appropriate. Most of these defendants belong in
jail.
V.

PREDICTING RECIDIVISM AMONG FIRST OFFENDERS

A fair question at this point is "how, in the absence of documented
recidivism, can the SEC identify a likely recidivist?" Many securities
law violators are situational offenders responding to a unique temptation
or business problem and, therefore, are unlikely to become repeat
offenders. 197 Moreover, the process of prediction is quite imprecise. 198

194. Bergal & Patel, supra note 179.
195. !d.
196. See Paul Shokovsky, Tracy Johnson & Daniel Lathrop, The Terrorism TradeOff: Focus on National Security After 9/11 Means That the Agency Has Turned Its Back
on Thousands of White Collar Crimes, http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/national/
311046_fbiterrorll.html (last visited July 24, 2008); Dan Eggen & John Solomon,
Justice Department's Focus Has Shifted, WASH. POST, Oct. 17,2007, at AI.
197. See Barnard, supra note 178, at 29-30 (discussing situational offenders). In a
careful study of securities law violators, fewer than 25 percent were ever again arrested
for any crime. WEISBURD ET AL. supra note 61, at 29.
198. See Alex R. Piquero et a!., The Criminal Career Paradigm, CRIME & Jusr. 359,
470 (2003) (noting that attempts to predict recidivism have been "fraught with problems"
and that it is particularly difficult to identify career criminals early in their careers); see
also WEISBURD ET AL., supra note 61, at 135 ("(It] is difficult to predict future criminality
on the basis of knowledge of the offender's past social and criminal conduct and
circumstances."). Indeed, in many cases, the process of identifying likely recidivists is
"little more than guesswork." Barnard, supra note 178, at 31.
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We do have some bases, however, for predicting recidivism among first
offenders. Courts routinely find that (1) a pattern of wrongdoing as
opposed to an isolated act; (2) lack of remorse or contrition;
(3) possession of specific skills, coupled with conditions providing
opportunity for harm (such as employment as an investment advisor or in
a brokerage firm); and (4) recent conduct indicating an intent to
recidivate, are all predictive of future misconduct. 199
I have suggested elsewhere that an alternative approach to the
question of prediction-especially applicable to first offenders-might
involve drawing a distinction between "opportunity takers" (those who
engage in fraud when a sudden or unusual opportunity arises that is too
good to pass up) and "opportunity seekers" (those who spend
considerable time imagining and engineering fraudulent schemes). 200
The former are less likely to recidivate than the latter.
Yet another predictor of recidivism is Antisocial Personal Disorder.
As noted above, one of the definitional characteristics of APD is repeated
violation of legal proscriptions dating back to childhood. 201 Indeed,
offenders with APD have no desire or ability to conform their behavior
to the requirements of the law. One way to predict recidivism, then,
would be to "diagnose" a defendant with APD. This diagnosis might
involve the administration of a paper-and-pencil test, a review of the
defendant's past conduct, interviews with the defendant and family
members, 202 and a holistic forensic evaluation? 03
VI. A PRESCRIPTION
This Article has so far traced two related themes: ( l) the existence
of a class of offenders, securities fraud recidivists, who make their living
through the perpetration of fraud schemes and (2) the inadequacy of the
current civil enforcement scheme to deter misconduct by securities fraud
recidivists.
To deal with these phenomena, I offer six proposals. First, I
propose a "one bite" rule for the SEC. A civil enforcement action may
199. See, e.g., SEC v. Ginsberg, 362 F.3d 1292, 1304 (lith Cir. 2004) (citing the
conditions for finding a likelihood of future misconduct); Lowry v. SEC, 340 F.3d 501,
505-07 (8th Cir. 2003) (same); SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1334 (5th Cir. 1978) (same).
200. Barnard, supra note 178, at 55.
20 I. See supra Part III .E.
202. It is unwise to rely exclusively on self-reporting by antisocials. They are as
likely to deceive and manipulate an interviewer as to deceive and manipulate their
victims.
203. This evaluation might employ the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R).
This diagnostic tool is the "primary means of measuring psychopathy today." Christina
Lee, The Judicial Response to Psychopathic Criminals: Utilitarianism Over Retribution,
31 LAW&PSYCHOL.REV. I25, 127(2007).
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be entirely appropriate for a first offender, but, under my proposed
approach, anyone who orchestrates a retail-level fraud and is sanctioned
(or voluntarily accepts a civil sanction), and then shows up again at the
SEC's doorstep should be referred to the Department of Justice for
criminal prosecution. This policy, which would not require legislation,
should be clearly stated and widely publicized by the SEC Enforcement
Division. While the threat of criminal prosecution may not deter the
most intractable and unrepentant defendants, it may have an impact on
others with more self-control. Furthermore, because the defendant
would face criminal prosecution and possible imprisonment, this
proposal should satisfy some of the retributive needs of securities fraud
victims. 204
Criminal referral will not always be possible, for the reasons
mentioned above (e.g., evidentiary problems and lack of skilled
personnel). Therefore, I propose the creation of a Securities Fraud
Recidivist Task Force within the SEC Enforcement Division. This Task
Force will bring together experts not only on retail-level securities frauds
but also on recidivism and its psychological and behavioral components.
When dealing with second-offenders in a civil enforcement context, Task
Force members will be positioned to advocate the most stringent civil
sanctions and ensure that they are enforced. This will include the timely
pursuit of contempt citations against defendants who violate the terms of
injunctions against them and the seizure of assets that result from their
schemes. Recidivists should not be left in the hands of junior-level
Enforcement Division lawyers or to the lawyers in the regional offices.
The Enforcement staff with whom recidivists deal should be experts.
Third, I propose that the SEC Enforcement Division undertake
monitoring of some securities fraud defendants after their first offenseat least those defendants who, based on psychological assessment,
behavioral history, and lack of remorse or contrition can be identified as
likely recidivists. Much like a probation officer, an SEC monitor would
keep track of the defendant's post-sanction activities and initiate action if
fraud recurs. Legislation should not be necessary to adopt this proposal;
the Commission is currently empowered to seek "any equitable relief that
may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors." 205 That
provision should permit a judge to authorize monitoring of a defendant
found liable for a securities law violation, upon a showing that the
defendant fits the recidivist profile.
It should also permit the

See Jayne W. Barnard, Allocution for Victims of Economic Crimes, 77 NOTRE
L. REV. 39 (2001) (proposing mechanisms by which victim satisfaction in fraud
cases might be improved).
205. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(5) (West 2008).
204.

DAME
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Commission to condition a settlement on the defendant's agreement to
permit ongoing monitoring of his actions. Some form of monitoring,
whether or not the defendant agrees to it, would seem to be a
straightforward act of risk management at the SEC. 206 The problem with
meaningful monitoring, of course, is cost.
Fourth, I propose that the SEC, in collaboration with the National
Association of Attorneys General, the North American Securities
Administrators Association, the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission, and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, create a
securities fraud registry, where prospective investors could find out if the
person with whom they are doing business has a history of securities
fraud, either at the state or federal level. We currently require
registration of sex offenders and physicians with a disciplinary record. 207
Though these systems are not foolproof (securities fraud defendants can
always change their names, and the names of the companies whose
securities they are selling), it would be inexpensive, and one more
vehicle by which investors could conduct "due diligence" before parting
with their money.Z 08
Fifth, let us assume that the foregoing recommendations are not
adopted. Assume further that the existing enforcement regimesequential civil actions initiated by the SEC--continues in place. At a
minimum, the Enforcement Division ought to adopt a strategy of
"progressive discipline." That is, any time a recidivist is the subject of a
civil enforcement action, the stakes should get higher. Specifically, the
SEC should do more than just string together a series of obey-the-law
mJunctions. Anyone facing a second injunction should also face a
significant civil penalty. It may be necessary to amend the Securities and
Exchange Act in order to effectuate this recommendation. Currently, the
three-tier penalty system does not include recidivism as a salient factor in
determining the amount of the penalty. 209 Recidivism should count,
however, and should count heavily, in setting the terms of a civil penalty.
Finally, I propose that the SEC (perhaps in collaboration with the
National Institute of Mental Health) conduct research into the securities
fraud recidivists now in prison: a review of their presentence reports,
interviews with them, the administration of pertinent diagnostic tests by
206. See Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1, 6 (2003) ("Certainly the state has a compelling interest in protecting its citizens
from these types of crimes. Why shouldn't the state be empowered to take preventive
action against any individual who is likely to wreak havoc on society?").
207. See, e.g., Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent
Offender Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006); Health Care Quality Improvement
Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11131 (1986).
208. For further discussion of this proposal, see Barnard, supra note 48, at 971-2.
209. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(u)(d)(3) (West 2008).
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trained forensic psychologists, and even brain scans, to gain a better
understanding of who these people are, how they assemble their fraud
"scripts," what threats they pose, and what sanctions are most
appropriate for them. Knowing more about securities law recidivists is
essential to formulate an appropriate law enforcement strategy. 210 There
is much work to be done.
VII. CONCLUSION
In recent years, the "lure" of securities fraud-affluent Americans
eager to increase their wealth by investing in the stock market, many of
whom are looking for a good deal-has given rise to an increasing
amount of serious misconduct in the financial markets. 211 Some of this
misconduct can be traced to securities fraud recidivists-men and
women who make their living by engaging repeatedly in "retail"
securities fraud schemes.
It is easy to underestimate securities fraud recidivists. Americans
often admire the audacity of such men, until we become their victims.
We also tend to romanticize con men, recalling the great cinematic con
men-Paul Newman and Robert Redford, 212 Leonardo DiCaprio,213
Richard Gere, 214 Nicholas Cage, 215 and Michael Caine. 216
In this Article, I have suggested another way to look at securities
fraud recidivists. They are not just rogues or petty thieves; they are
dangerous predators. Some of them, moreover, may suffer from a
personality disorder, APD, that is likely to lead them to commit frauds
again and again. The SEC's current scheme of civil sanctions does not
adequately address the problem of securities fraud recidivists. More
aggressive thought and more considered action is the proper response to
these criminals.

210. See Dean Mobbs et al., Law, Responsibility, and the Brain, 5 PLOS BIOLOGY
693, 696 (2007) (arguing generally that research into the links between mental illness,
neurological disorder and criminal conduct is "urgently needed").
211. See SHOVER & HOCHSTETLER, supra note 62, at 35 (discussing "lure"); id. at 167
("[There is] reason to believe that we are witnessing a rising tide of white-collar crime in
Western nations. Reasons for the increase include new forms and an expanded supply of
lure, noncredible oversight, and uncertain punishment for those who commit white-collar
crime.").
212. THE STING (Universal Studios, 1973).
213. CATCH ME IF You CAN (Dreamworks, 2002).
214. THE HOAX (Miramax, 2007).
215. MATCHSTICK MEN (Warner Bros. Pictures, 2003).
216. DIRTY, ROTTEN SCOUNDRELS (Orion Pictures, 1988). Films and television series
also offer appealing portraits of female con artists. They include Angelica Huston,
Tatum O'Neal, and Minnie Driver. See THE GRIFTERS (Miramax, 1990); PAPER MOON
(Paramount Pictures, 1973); The Riches (2006).
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At a minimum, the Department of Justice should elevate the priority
now given to the prosecution of perpetrators of securities frauds, and
especially to the prosecution of securities fraud recidivists. The SEC
should develop expertise regarding the nature of recidivism and create a
Recidivist Task Force to put that expertise in one place. The SEC should
also commit resources to monitoring likely recidivists, to interdict the
harm that they can cause. State and federal law enforcement agencies
should organize a registry through which investors can keep track of
securities fraud offenders. And Congress should consider better-targeted
sanctions to deal with this predatory population. Above all, we must
learn much more about the biological and social determinants of the
people who commit fraud.
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